The evolution of cooperation has long been studied in Game Theory and Evolutionary Biology. In this study, we investigate the impact of movement control in a spatial version of the Prisoner's Dilemma in a three dimensional space. A population of agents is evolved via an asynchronous genetic algorithm, to optimize their strategy. Our results show that cooperators rapidly join into static clusters, creating favorable niches for fast replications. Surprisingly, even though remaining inside those clusters, cooperators keep moving faster than defectors. We analyze the system dynamics to explain the stability of this behavior.
Introduction
The problem of the evolution of cooperation has been of interest for a long time. This problem is often tackled by using simple models, such as considering interactions to be a game of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). Early results in game theory showed that cooperation in the case of well-mixed population was not a given (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Smith 1982 ), yet it is a very common phenomenon in nature.
The PD is a classic two-player "game" in which players are given two options: cooperate (C) or defect (D). The payoffs are such that T > R > P > S, where T stands for Temptation (D versus C), R for Reward (C versus C), P for punishment (D versus D) and S for Sucker's payoff (C versus D) . It is also often admitted that 2R > T + S, meaning that cooperating is overall better for the whole system, while defecting is better for the individual. In particular, T > R and P > S means that it is always the best choice for an individual to defect, no matter the strategy of its opponent. In a system where everyone can interact with everyone else, without memory of past games or ways to distinguish opponents, defecting is obviously the best strategy. However, it has been shown that spacial locality helps cooperators survive and even thrive (Nowak and May 1993) .
This early work has triggered several lines of investigation, in particular attempts to add movement. While results can be mixed in specific cases (Sicardi et al. 2009) , it is widely recognized that movement is helpful (Vainstein et al. 2007 ). Particular interest has been given to random movement (e.g. Chen et al. 2011; Gelimson et al. 2013) . In this case, though, we argue that this movement acts as a way to restrict the neighborhood of specific individuals, thus increasing locality. Diffusion (Vainstein and Arenzon 2014) is another example where the environment is sparse, allowing agents to move to empty areas. Interesting dynamics can also be obtained when the agents can actually choose on their own when and/or where to move (Aktipis 2004 (Aktipis , 2011 .
In this work , we investigate the impact of limited movement control on agents in a three dimensional space. Agents are all moving at a common constant speed, but choose their direction through the output of a neural network. We also add the possibility to communicate, through the emission of signal. Such communication might be similar to greenbeards, a phenomenon where an otherwise useless phenotype element is used to choose whether to cooperate or not (see for instance Gardner and West 2010) . We argue, however, that a slightly different mechanism is at work in our case. Indeed, since the signal is also an output of the neural network, agents can adapt their response to the environment. Signal may be used both to detect where friendly agents are, or as a way to choose a strategy. In this last case, cooperation can arise both from the fact that related agents will have similar signaling (similar to kin selection), or the adaptability of an external agent (mimicry). We show that, when left to their own devices, cooperators will move more than defectors, even though their cluster is static. They also tend to communicate much more than defectors, displaying a complex dynamic to prevent defectors from taking over. We also show that speed matters, as it impacts the radius of the cluster.
In the following, we describe the details of the model used in our experiments. Then, we present the proportion of cooperators over time, and compare it to the static case (no movement allowed). We also show other metrics, such as the average displacement over time and the amount of received signal over time. We then analyse those results as well as giving a simple condition on the survival of a cluster before concluding. 
Model
A population of agents move around in a three-dimensional space. Each one is playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game with its direct neighbors. The strategies are evolved via a continuous genetic algorithm, that is agents with high level of fitness are allowed to replicate (with mutations) whenever possible.
Environment
Agents are placed in a three-dimensional world with periodic boundary conditions. While most previous work focuses on two-dimensional simulation, a third dimension gives the system more freedom of movement, making it easier to choose not to play (i.e. move away). The environment is a toroidal cube of size 600 (arbitrary unit), where each face connects directly to the opposite one. The world is considered to be continuous, so that agents can get arbitrarily close to each other (Figure 1 ), up to the precision of the simulation. Thus, the dimensionality of the simulation comes down to the choice of the agent's interaction radius.
We enforce a maximum size for the population. This makes it easier to compare, for instance, to lattices, where the number of agent also has a physical maximum due to the number of positions. Note that this maximum does not have to be equal to the number of agents at any moment in the simulation. This might also happen in lattices, for instance in Vainstein and Arenzon (2014) where partially empty lattices are used to add a diffusion phenomenon.
Finally, a given simulation is prevented from stopping from lack of agents by adding one new random agent per time step if the current population is below a threshold (see Table 1 ).
Agents
Agents are given a certain energy, that also acts as their fitness. Each agent comes with a set of 12 different sensors. The neural network (represented on Figure 2 ) takes the information from those sensors as inputs, in order to decide the agent's actions at every time step. The possible actions amount to the agent's movement, a Prisoner's Dilemma action (cooperate or defect) and two output signals. The architecture is composed of a 12 input, 10 hidden, 5 output, and 10 context neurons connected to the hidden layer (see Figure  2 ).
The agents' motion is controlled by M 1 and M 2 , outputting two Euler rotation angles: ψ for pitch (i.e. elevation) and θ for yaw (i.e. heading), with floating point values between 0 and π. Even though the agents' speed is fixed, the rotation angles still allow the agent to control its average speed (for example, if ψ is constant and theta equals zero, the agents will continuously loop on a circular trajectory, which results in an almost-zero average speed over 100 steps).
The outputs S
(1) out and S (2) out control the signals emitted on two distinct channels, which are propagated through the environment to the agents within a neighboring radius set to 50. The choice for two channels was made to allow for signals of higher complexity, and possibly more interesting dynamics than greenbeard studies (Gardner and West 2010) .
The received signals are summed separately for each direction (front, back, right, left, up, down) , and weighted by the squared inverse of the emitters distance. This way, agents further away have much less impact on the sensors than closer ones do. Every agent is able to receive signals on the two emission channels, from 6 different directions, totalling 12 different values sensed per time step. For example, the input S (6,1) in corresponds to the signals reaching the agent from the neighbors below.
Fitness
At every time step, agents are playing a N-player version of the prisoner's dilemma with their surrounding, meaning that they make a single decision that affects all agents around them. They get reward and/or punishment based on the number of cooperator around them. Their decision is one of the outputs of their neural network.
The payoff matrix is an extension of Chiong and Kirley (2012) , where we added the distance to take into account the spatial continuity. It is defined by:
With b the bonus, c the cooperation cost, b > c > 0, and distance the Euclidian distance between two agents. Radius represent the sphere of radius radius around the agent. Note that the agent itself is not considered part of its neighborhood. The distance is not part of the original fitness, which made sense since Chiong and Kirley (2012) are basing their simulation on a lattice, where the distance is always the same. Our version integrates nicely the fact that interactions with distant agents should be much weaker than with closer ones.
Another advantage of this fitness is that defection can also be assimilated to not playing (no cost). Note that there is also no cost and no reward for cooperating when alone.
We can see that this fitness is equivalent to the traditional PD game, since, for two agents A and B at a distance d of each other, (1) yields the payoff matrix:
It is clear that for the conditions b > c > 0, this matrix correspond to a PD. Based on the outcome of the match, agents can choose a new direction, which is similar to leaving the group in the walk away strategy (Aktipis 2004 ), the main difference being that, in our case, it is also possible for groups to split. It is also similar in another aspect: there is a cost to leaving a group, as a lone agent may need time to meet others.
Evolution/Parameters
Evolution is done continuously. Agents with negative or zero energy are removed, while agents with energy above a threshold are forced to reproduce, within the limits of one infant per time step. The reproduction cost is low enough, considering the threshold, to not put the life of the agent at risk. Table 1 indicates the various parameters used for evolution.
Results
Results were obtained on a set of 10 runs, with additional sets used for control. In our setting, all agents have a constant speed, but can choose in which direction they are heading. This allows for pseudo-static behaviors by looping in circles. While some characteristics, such as agents' movement, were strongly run dependent, the overall dynamics of the system was not. At the beginning of the run, the environment is seeded with random agents. Since all weights in their neural network are set at random, roughly half of the agents initially choose to cooperate while the other half choose to defect. This leads to a fast extinction of cooperators (Figure 3 , until approximately 50000 time steps), until a group emerges strong enough to survive. The second phase follows, in which cooperators are quickly increasing in number due to the autocatalytic nature of this strategy (Figure 3) .
A third step happens eventually, where defectors invade the cluster, followed either by the survival of the cluster due to cooperators running away or a reboot of the cycle. In case of survival, oscillations in the proportion of cooperators can be observed. However, this phenomenon is averaged away over multiple runs, since period and phase of the oscillations are not correlated from one experiment to the other. Figure  4 shows those oscillations in a typical run. The frequency of those phenomenon is shown in Table 2 . Table 2 : Number of oscillations between high and low cooperations over 10 6 time steps in ten runs
As a control, we ran the simulation after removing the possibility for agents to move. In this case, cooperators have much less to fear from defectors and quickly overtake the whole population while defectors quickly exhaust their energy as well as the energy of their cooperative neighbors ( Figure 5 ). Were a defector to appear near a cluster of cooperators, the cluster would react by "reproducing away". However, the chances to be overtaken by the defectors is much higher than in the dynamic case. Another control was to allow agents to have a neighborhood large enough to interact with all other agents, or a speed such that the system is virtually well-mixed. In both cases, the classical result holds, with an almost homogeneous population of defectors, with the occasional cooperator obtained from random generation.
Finally, we observed the movement tendencies (figure 6) and signal transmission (figure 8) among the two groups of agents. The average displacement is the norm of the total movement over 100 steps (an example for 5 steps is illustrated at figure 7). It is interesting to note that, even though they mostly stay in clusters, cooperators move more than defectors. In the next section, we will attempt to interpret those results.
Analysis
The critical mass necessary for a cooperator to survive can be computed from its surrounding and from the costs of cooperation (Nowak and May 1993) . Let us note R the maximum interaction radius, N the total number of agents inside the neighborhood (excluding the cooperator itself), and n the number of other cooperators in the radius. For the cooperator to survive over time, the costs have to exactly balance or be less than the benefits of cooperation. If we assume that agents are homogeneously distributed in the euclidian sphere around our focus, we can rewrite the sum over all surrounding agents weighted by the distance as an integral over the densities ρ coop and ρ all :
This gives us the equivalence:
Which yields:
Therefore the condition for survival is simply that the proportion of cooperators should be at least
Note that this condition is strongly dependent on the actual distribution of agents. The closer the cooperators, the stronger they are against external threats. Conversely, a defector at the very center of a group of cooperators can be much more damaging.
In previous work (Chen et al. 2011) , it has been observed that random mobility was helping cooperator, if the speed is low enough. However, in this case, this mobility has only the effect of reducing the neighborhood. Additionally, if the speed is too high, the system gets to an almost well-mixed state, with the expected results on cooperation. Note that even the effect of high speed can be counterbalanced by a motion keeping the agents in a neighborhood.
In absence of movement, we have pseudo-movement arising from cooperators dying near defectors. As a result, the cluster of cooperators "reproduces away" from its previous position.
When movement is enabled, cooperators also appear in clusters, inside which they seem to be moving quickly. This mainly results from the major phenomenon helping cooperators, that is their autocatalytic tendencies, which might be a bias from the limit on the population size. If enough cooperators are close to each other, they will keep their energy high at all times, allowing them to reproduce as much as possible. Once the population reaches its maximum capacity, the cooperators typically represent a larger fraction of the population, especially when weighted by the energy they possess. For this reason, the cluster will remain stable until some agents die of old age, before being immediately replaced by other cooperators with a high probability.
Also, this strategy might allow them to avoid spending too much time close to defectors, while remaining constantly in the neighborhood of fellow cooperators.
The clustering is strongly dependent on signaling among the cooperating agents, hinted by the difference in signal emission between cooperators and defectors. Additionally, we performed two batch of five control runs with respectively signal on or off at all time. In the "off" case, no cluster can form, yielding a near-uniform population of defectors. The "on" case still shows qualitatively the emergence of clusters, but are much more diffuse as signaling is now ambiguous.
Conclusion
In this article, we introduced a three-dimensional model of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma. While it can be expected that cooperators, if any are present, would quickly evolve to form clusters, it was interesting to see that they still have a higher movement rate overall than defectors. This is even more surprising considering that those clusters do not seem to move fast. Instead, analysis shows that cooperators are moving quickly inside the cluster, which may be a way to adapt to an aggressive environment.
Additionally, comparison with the static case showed that movement made the apparition of cooperators harder, but more stable in the long run. Since it is harder for defectors to overtake a cluster of cooperators, our systems often show a soft bistability, meaning that they will eventually switch from one state to the other. It is even possible to observe a sort of symbiosis, where cooperators are generating more energy than necessary, which is in turn used by peripheral defectors. In this case, replacement rates allow cooperators to stay ahead, keeping this small ecosystem stable.
Finally, this cohesion among cooperators seems to be enhanced by signaling, even though signal might attract defectors. Additional investigation on the transfer of entropy, for instance, could be a promising next step.
